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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1942, Nazi troops abducted seventeen-year old Elsa
Iwanowa, from Rostov, Russia, and transported her to Germany with
approximately 2,000 other adolescents.' Ford Werke, the German
subsidiary of Ford Motor Corporation (Ford), purchased Iwanowa
and many of the others as slave laborers for their Cologne, Germany
truck manufacturing plant.2 There, she was crammed with the others
into a locked wooden hut, without heat, bedding, running water, or
sewage facilities.3 Ford Werke manufactured approximately sixty
percent of the three-ton tracked vehicles the German army used
during World War II. 4
Slave labor was an essential part of the German war effort, with
an estimated seven million men, women, and children forced to work
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under unbearable conditions for such corporations as BMW,5
Daimler-Benz,6 General Motors' Opel Division, 7 and Ford Werke.8
The Nazis took their slave laborers from the captive populations,
concentration camp inmates, and prisoners of war.9 From 1942 to
1945, Ford Werke overseers forced Iwanowa and the other slave
laborers to perform heavy labor at the plant without pay, building
motor blocks for the German military trucks.10 At times, the overseers
beat the laborers with rubber truncheons if they failed to meet
production quotas.1
In 1998, fifty-three years after the War's end, Iwanowa became
the first plaintiff in a class action suit filed against Ford and Ford
Werke, accusing them of complicity with the Nazi government and of
willing participation in the Reich's forced labor program." The suit
named Ford because it owned a majority of Ford Werke's outstanding
shares during World War II. 1' Iwanowa sought compensation for the
reasonable value of her services, restitution, and damages for the pain
and suffering caused by the inhuman working conditions. 4 She
partially based her claim on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),5
asserting that the law granted the court subject matter jurisdiction
5. MICHAEL BERENBAUM, THE WORLD MUST KNOW: THE HISTORY OF THE
HOLOCAUST AS TOLD IN THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 130-31
(1993).
6. Id.
7. REINHOLD BILLSTEIN ET AL., WORKING FOR THE ENEMY: FORD, GENERAL
MOTORS, AND FORCED LABOR IN GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 73 (2000).
8. Id. at 90.
9. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
10. Id. at 434
11. Id.
12. BILLSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 239.
13. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
14. Id. at 434.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The full text of the ATCA states: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The "law of nations" is usually interpreted to
include acts such as genocide; slavery; murder and summary executions; the "disappearance" of
individuals; torture or other similar cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; prolonged arbitrary
detention; widespread racial discrimination; or gross violation of internationally recognized
human rights. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.S. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction over Alien's Action for
Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED.
387, §§ 13-31 (2002) for further discussion of acts that may constitute a basis for a suit under
"the law of nations." See generally id. §§ 32-37 for discussion of treaties that may provide a basis
for suit under "treaty of the United States."
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over her tort claims under customary international law, thereby
allowing her, as an alien, to sue a U.S. corporation in a U.S. court. 6
The first U.S. Congress originally passed the ATCA as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.17 Congress' intent was to provide a federal
forum for foreign plaintiffs to recover damages for torts that violated
international law or a U.S. treaty.18 The founders desired that the
foreign affairs remain within the federal government's jurisdiction, 9
and the newly created federal courts, rather than state courts, retained
original jurisdiction over matters relating to foreign affairs.2" The
impetus for passage of the ATCA arose in the late 1700's, when
several incidents involving torts against foreign dignitaries occurred
while they were conducting their official business on U.S. soil.2 The
Continental Congress found it could not exercise jurisdiction over the
tortfeasors in those cases.22 Based on adverse foreign reaction to the
earlier incidents, the Continental Congress recognized that
uncompensated torts against foreign dignitaries might deeply offend
foreign nations, possibly leading to war.23 In planning the new federal
government, John Jay was concerned about the consequences of
leaving the foreign affairs of the new United States to a "variety of
independent courts and judges appointed by different and
independent governments. '"24
To remedy this serious situation, in 1789 the U.S. Congress
passed the ATCA to allow aliens to bring tort claims based on treaties
and international law in the newly created federal courts without
regard to the amount in controversy. 2' For nearly 200 years after its
16. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 439. "The ATCA grants district courts subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain 'suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in
violation of the law of nations. "' Id.
17. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2000)).
18. Id.
19. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986), reprinted in THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 119, 141 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony
D'Amato eds., 1999).
20. Id. at 142-43.
21. Id. at 139-41.
22. Id.
23. 21 J. CONT'L CONG. 1136, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
amlaw/lwjc.html (last visited July 22, 2003) ("That as instances may occur, in which, for the
avoidance of war, it may be expedient to repair out of the public treasury injuries recommitted by
individuals, and the property of the innocent be exposed to reprisal, the author of those injuries
should compensate the damage out of his private fortune.").
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (Emory University School of Law 1996), available
at http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDERAL/federalist/feder3.html (last visited March 19, 2003).
25. Casto, supra note 19, at 143-44.
Seattle University Law Review
passage, the ATCA was rarely used.26 It was not until 1980, in
Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala,27 that the ATCA was successfully used to
establish that the law "opens federal courts to civil suits by aliens for
torts committed in violation of customary international law, even
when the case involves acts perpetrated in another country by a non-
U.S. citizen."" In this landmark case, Paraguayan citizens
successfully used the ATCA to recover damages in federal court from
a former Paraguayan official for acts of official torture that had
occurred in Paraguay.29
Since Filartiga, aliens have repeatedly used the ATCA to recover
damages for internationally recognized torts such as official torture,
prolonged arbitrary detention, and summary execution.3" Benefits of
such uses of the ATCA accrue not only to the foreign citizens gaining
a forum for their grievances, but also to the United States, which can
visibly demonstrate its goal of furthering human rights worldwide.3
[T]he United States itself has a real interest in seeing to it that
nationals of other countries are not the victims of terrorism or
genocide perpetrated by their own governments or by other
entities in foreign lands .... The interest that a country has in
its nationals is expanded, under the law of human rights, to
include an interest in non-nationals, especially where basic
human rights are threatened.32
Returning to the Iwanowa case, that court agreed with Iwanowa's
allegations that Ford had engaged in slave trading under The
Nuremberg Tribunals,33 and that U.S. courts had repeatedly held that
26. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 n.17 (D. Mass 1995).
27. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Filartigas brought this action in the Eastern District
of New York against Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala (Pefia), also a citizen of Paraguay, for
wrongfully causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, Joelito. In 1976, Joelito
was kidnapped and tortured to death by Pefia, Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay. The plaintiffs claim that these acts were in retaliation for the political activities of Dr.
Filartiga, who had opposed the government of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner. When
Dr. Filartiga attempted to institute a criminal action in Paraguay against Pefia and the police for
the murder of his son, Dr. Filartiga's attorney was arrested, threatened with death, and has since
allegedly been disbarred without just cause. Id. at 878.
28. Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under ATCA: A Practical Assessment, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 549 (2000).
29. See id. at 552.
30. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
31. See Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?Judge Bork's Concept of the
Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985), reprinted in THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 19, at 106.
32. Id.
33. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) ("The Nuremberg
Tribunals held that the enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during World War
II constituted a crime against humanity in violation of customary international law.").
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"deportation to slave labor" violates the law of nations.34
Nevertheless, the court dismissed her claims against Ford, finding that
the applicable limitations period had run.3 5  Although the tort
occurred fifty-three years before Iwanowa brought the action, the
court's ruling stood even though the ATCA has no express or implied
statute of limitations.36
The explanation for this seeming anomaly lies in the well-
established doctrine that when a federal statute contains no limitations
period of its own, federal courts must look to analogous state or federal
law in order to borrow a statute of limitations.37 At times, courts
apply the limitations periods of analogous federal statutes, and at other
times they apply the limitations period of the law of the state in which
the court is located.38 If the tort occurred outside the United States,
the court may even examine the limitations period of the foreign
country where the act occurred.39 District courts, forced to choose
from a variety of state, federal, and foreign limitations periods,
therefore face the very type of situation that the ATCA was originally
designed to prevent: a variety of independent courts and judges,
appointed by different governments, inconsistently applying the law.4"
In 1991, the Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA),41 which provides a fixed ten-year statute of limitations. 42
Many courts are now analogizing ATCA claims to the TVPA and
34. Id.
35. Id. at 466-68.
36. See Inre World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d, 1160, 1179
(N.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Japanese Forced Labor]. There is no language in the ATCA
whatsoever regarding the period in which an action can be brought. See supra note 15 for the full
text of the ATCA.
37. Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 359
(C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal II].
38. See id.; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
39. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1548-49 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,192 (D. Mass 1995).
40. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 182 n.23.
41. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)).
42. The TVPA was passed to implement the Torture Convention and to supplement the
ATCA. The TVPA differs in four fundamental respects from the ATCA. First, while the
TVPA applies only to cases involving torture and extrajudicial killing, the ATCA is much
broader in scope, including "any tort" in violation of the law of nations. Second, any individual
can sue under the TVPA, but only an alien can sue under ATCA. Third, the TVPA has an
express state action requirement, where the defendant must be acting under the actual or
apparent authority or under color of a foreign nation's law; the ATCA has no such limitation.
Finally, the TVPA has an express ten-year statute of limitations, while the ATCA has no
express limitations period. See Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Protection of International
Human Rights and the United States Courts, in Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States, Selected Document, 170 F.R.D. 201, 288-89 (June 13-16, 1996).
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consistently borrowing its ten-year limitations period.43 Other courts
that have considered the limitations period applicable to ATCA
claims since the passage of the TVPA have left unresolved the
question of whether the TVPA provides the closest federal analogy.44
This Comment argues that inconsistent application of limitations
periods to ATCA claims does not provide sufficient and certain notice
to potential parties to allow them to bring a timely claim, thereby
potentially denying them an opportunity to receive a fair hearing in
federal courts. While many courts have used the TVPA to apply a
ten-year limitations period to ATCA claims, this practice is by no
means universal. Therefore, absent a U.S. Supreme Court ruling to
provide consistent guidance on the applicable ATCA limitations
period, Congress should amend the statute to provide a specific ten-
year limitations period for most torts. Because both international and
U.S. laws provide that murder committed as part of the crime of
genocide has no statute of limitations,4" ATCA claims arising from
genocidal acts should also be free of any limitations period. In
addition, the amended ATCA should expressly provide that equitable
tolling principles and the discovery rule apply, so that there is no
leeway for courts to interpret the law to limit application of those
doctrines.
Following these introductory remarks, Part II provides general
background on statute of limitations jurisprudence and related
concepts, such as borrowing statutes, the doctrines of repose and
laches, equitable tolling, and the discovery rule. Part II also examines
the application of limitations law in federal courts. Part III reviews
the history and progression of application of limitations law to the
ATCA, focusing on the inconsistency of the limitations periods in
representative ATCA claims. Part IV examines arguments for and
against amending the ATCA to include a fixed limitations period, and
evaluates several proposed alternatives for Congress to consider when
amending the ATCA. Part IV also presents the key elements that the
amended ATCA should contain. Part V presents conclusions about
the appropriate limitations period for Congress to adopt.
II. BACKGROUND ON LIMITATIONS LAW
Before discussing how the courts apply the statute of limitations
to ATCA cases, it is important to review the rationale for having
43. See Unocal II, 176 F.R.D. at 359.
44. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
45. See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub.
L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045, (e) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2000)).
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limitations periods in the first place. Because there are several types of
limitations periods, this Part provides basic background information
to aid the reader in understanding the sometimes-difficult contortions
that the law takes in applying a limitations period to ATCA claims.
Section A generally explains statute of limitations law, including the
related concepts of statutes of repose and the doctrine of laches.
Running of the statute of limitations is usually presented as an
affirmative defense to tort claims. Therefore, Section B examines the
plaintiffs typical responses to defense claims that the limitations
period has run, including waiver, equitable principles of tolling and
estoppel, and the discovery rule. Because claimants can only file
ATCA claims in federal court, Section C reviews how federal courts
typically handle statute of limitations issues when a statute contains no
express limitations period.
A. Statutes of Limitations and Comparable Doctrines
1. Statutes of Limitations
Running of the statute of limitations is an important defense
used in tort litigation to bar judicial action by expiration of an allotted
time within which an action must be brought from accrual of the cause
of action.46 By successfully asserting the running of a statute of
limitations, defendants are relieved of the obligation to defend against
a claim for which evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
important witnesses are no longer available.47 Statutes of limitations
protect defendants "against claims brought after a period of time
which was sufficient for a person of ordinary diligence to have brought
an action. '""8 They provide repose to defendants and protect them
against "plaintiffs who may assert fraudulent claims at a time when
the true facts can no longer be proved."49 Statutes of limitations also
preserve scarce judicial resources by allowing the courts to dismiss
invalid claims, insuring that "stale claims" will not have to be heard."0
46. See 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.1, at 4, 8 (1991); 1
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 5:25, at 868 (1983) ("It would
be difficult, indeed, to over-emphasize the practical significance and importance of the statute of
limitations in tort litigation.").
47. 1 CORMAN, supra note 46, § 1.1, at 11-12.
48. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 46, § 5:25, at 869-70.
49. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as
Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 589, 591 (1996).
50. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88.
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The requirement of a limitations period for civil suits induces
plaintiffs not to neglect valid claims and to provide notice to the
defendant."' The courts presume that if plaintiffs do not attempt to
seek relief after a reasonable period, there is no valid claim.5 2  In
summary, statutes of limitations impose some finality on the
litigation 3 and "promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber. 5 4
All statutes of limitations have one aspect in common: the time
for filing suit does not commence until the plaintiffs cause of action
accrues, that is, "when all requisite elements of a cause of action have
occurred." 5 The typical statutory period for unintentional tort claims
in most states is between two and four years from the date of injury. 6
The operation of statutes of limitations for criminal prosecution does
not differ fundamentally from civil limitations statutes. 57  Under
certain circumstances, courts are statutorily required to look beyond
the borders of their jurisdiction in order to "borrow" foreign
limitations periods.
2. Borrowing Statutes
A "borrowing statute" provides that the limitations period from
another jurisdiction be applied to the case at hand in the forum state.
Such borrowing statutes may prevent bringing an otherwise valid suit
in the forum state if the same suit would have been barred in the state
where the cause of action arose (the locus)."8 For example, if a tort
occurs in the locus, and suit is timely brought in the forum, the forum
court may examine the applicable statute of limitations in the state
where the cause of action arose (lex loci).s9 If the limitations period is
shorter in the locus than in the forum, the forum may apply the
shorter period to bar the claim.6" Some borrowing statutes present an
even harsher reverse effect, such as where a claim that is not time
barred by the lex loci, but time barred by the forum, may still be time
51. 1 CORMAN, supra note 46, § 1.1, at 13.
52. lid.
53. See JEANM. EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 168 (1995).
54. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
55. Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of Repose and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Time for a
New Interpretation, 32 CONN. L, REV. 1027, 1029 (2000).
56. See EGGEN, supra note 53, at 169.
57. See 1 CORMAN, supra note 46, § 1.6, at 114-15.
58. ADOLPH J. LEVY, SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS § 2.01, at 34
(1987).
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id.
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barred.61 Other borrowing statutes require that the court investigate
the statutes of limitations of both the forum and locus, with the result
that a claim is time barred if either state's limitations period has
expired.62 A statutory exception is often implemented to mitigate this
very harsh rule, providing that a cause of action not be barred in the
forum if the cause of action is in favor of a citizen or resident of the
forum.63
Where a forum does not have a formal borrowing statute, the
forum may still borrow from the foreign state when the forum applies
the foreign state's law under conflict of law principles.64 The forum
may decide to bar a foreign cause of action based on its evaluation of
three factors: first, whether the forum's statute of limitations bars the"right" to sue as opposed to barring the "remedy"; second, whether
the forum holds that the statute of limitations is a procedural as
opposed to a substantive rule; and third, on the effects of applicable
prior judicial decisions. 65
3. Statutes of Repose and Doctrine of Laches
Statutes of limitations are sometimes confused with two related
doctrines that also act to time bar a suit: statutes of repose and laches.
Statutes of repose set a fixed period within which a plaintiff must file
suit.66 Whereas statutes of limitations usually begin to run from the
time a cause of action accrues, statutes of repose may commence and
run before the cause of action accrues.6 7  Expiration of the repose
period creates an absolute bar to untimely litigation, subject only to
legislative exceptions.68 Statutes of repose affect the availability of an
underlying right to bring an action and extinguish that right after a
specified time measured from a specific event, even if this event occurs
before the cause of action accrues.69
Statutes of repose generally supplement or override the discovery
rule.7" Repose statutes may begin to run from the time of the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 2.06, at 39-40.
64. Id. § 2.03, at 37.
65. Id.
66. Kulbaski, supra note 55, at 1031.
67. LEVY, supra note 58, § 3.01, at 76.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
167 (5th ed. 1984). Under the discovery rule, the limitations period does not begin until the
plaintiff knew or should have known enough facts to enable initiation of a suit. Id.
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defendant's act. 1 For example, when a product is released to market,
the statute of repose may begin to run on the day the product is sold.7 2
If a user of the product is subsequently harmed because of latent
product defects, the victim's cause of action may be barred if the
repose period has expired before a claim is discovered or even exists. 3
This may be so even though the statute of limitations for a particular
71cause of action has barely begun to run.
Laches is an equitable doctrine that may also act to time bar a
suit. Laches serves as an affirmative defense that denies relief to a
plaintiff who unreasonably or inexcusably delays asserting a claim,
causing prejudice to the defendant.7 Such a situation might occur
even within the statute of limitations period, as when a plaintiff holds
off filing an otherwise valid claim until he learns that the defendant
has destroyed her own exculpatory evidence.
B. Assertions Against Running of the Limitations Period
Affirmative assertions against claims that the limitations period
has run include waiver, equitable estoppel, equitable tolling, and the
discovery rule. This Section describes the operation of each of these
concepts in more detail.
1. Waiver
Waiver occurs where the defendant has abandoned, renounced,
repudiated, or surrendered a privilege or right to use the affirmative
defense of running of the limitations period by failure to plead, express
agreement not to assert, or conduct that estops the defendant from
interposing it.76 For example, Swiss banks faced with an ATCA
lawsuit by slave labor victims of World War II and fearing discovery
relating to the banks' concealment of various accounts, expressly
waived the statute of limitations as a defense in order to avoid
discovery that might have disclosed damaging information."
2. Equitable Estoppel and Equitable Tolling
The doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are
often confused. Equitable estoppel precludes a party from taking
71. Id. at 168.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. LEVY, supra note 58, § 6.22, at 241.
75. 1 CORMAN, supra note 46, § 3.3.2, at 183.
76. 1 id. at 175-76.
77. Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in
American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 806 n.29 (2002).
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advantage of a predicament into which the party's own conduct has
placed his adversary." For example, a plaintiff may claim equitable
estoppel when she reasonably relied on defendant's fraudulent
concealment of a cause of action. 9 On the other hand, equitable
tolling acts to stop the statute of limitations from running after the
accrual date has already passed.8"
Equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are sometimes used
interchangeably by the courts.8" The two doctrines can be
distinguished by careful examination of the facts of an ATCA case,
Cabello v. Ferndndez.82  Following the 1973 coup d'etat against
Chilean President Salvador Allende, a "caravan of death" comprised
of military officers engaged in widespread extrajudicial killing, torture,
and abuse of individuals.8" The squad selected thirteen prisoners,
including Aldo Cabello, for execution. 4 They murdered Cabello by
use of a corvo, a "short, curved knife... designed to inflict wounds
that... cause a slow and painful death. ' ' s  The Chilean military
deliberately concealed his burial location from plaintiffs, and caused
confusion by the issuance of three different death certificates between
1973 and 1991.86
When an ATCA complaint was filed by Cabello's survivors in
1990 against one of the officers, the defendant argued the limitations
period had already run because equitable tolling of the limitations
period applied only for a short period after the plaintiffs had obtained,
or by due diligence could have obtained, the information necessary to
file the lawsuit.87 The court disagreed, citing Judge Posner, who had
clarified that equitable tolling applies where a plaintiff, through no
fault of a defendant, has been unable to obtain information necessary
to decide whether his injury is due to the defendant's wrongdoing. 88
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, applies where a defendant
conceals evidence or takes other active steps to prevent the plaintiff
from suing in time (i.e., the defendant's act estops the accrual of the
78. KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 105, at 733.
79. LEVY, supra note 58, § 6.38, at 254.
80. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 467 (D.N.J. 1999).
81. Cabello v. Fernindez, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1330 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
82. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
83. Id. at 1326-27.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1330.
87. Id.
88. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990), cited in Cabello, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
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limitations period altogether).89  In Cabello, the facts supported
application of equitable estoppel, as the Chilean government's
concealment of both the decedent's burial location and the actual
cause of death prevented plaintiffs from bringing their wrongful death
action until 1990.9 Rather than tolling the limitations period from the
time of the tort itself, as the defendant requested, the court deemed
1990 to be the actual date of accrual of the claim and therefore the
start of the limitations period. 1
3. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule is another doctrine that affects the operation
of a limitations period. Whereas the limitations period for a tort
generally accrues on the date that the defendant commits the tortious
act, as a practical matter a claim cannot fairly accrue if the plaintiff is
not yet aware that an injury even exists.92 The discovery rule operates
to hold off the start of the limitations period until the date the plaintiff
knew or should have known certain facts that would enable him to file
suit.9s
For example, New York State's discovery rule provides that the
three-year personal injury limitations period begins to run at the time
of discovery of the injury or when the injury should have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.94 Ultimately,
if the plaintiff has not discovered the cause of an injury within five
years after discovering that the injury exists, the claim will be time
barred. 9 As another example, the discovery rule applies in all state
and federal cases based on property damage or personal injury
resulting from hazardous substance contamination.
In ATCA cases of "disappearances,'  the survivors may not
know with certainty that the victim has even died, so it is reasonable
89. Cabello, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31, 1330 n.4.
90. Id. at 1331.
91. Id.
92. MacAyeal, supra note 49, at 599.
93. LEVY, supra note 58, § 5.06, at 186.
94. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214-c(2).
95. Id. 214-c(4).
96. MacAyeal, supra note 49, at 605.
97. "Disappearance" is a term that was initially used to describe the uncertain fate of those
who were tortured and killed at Chilean interrogation centers:
[Tihe vast majority of the 912 reported cases of disappearance in Chile
occurred between 1973 and 1976 under the military government and concerned
political opponents of the military dictatorship, from different social strata,
most of them activists in the Chilean leftist parties. Those responsible for the
disappearances were members of the army, air force, the carabineers and
persons acting with the acquiescence of the Chilean authorities.
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for the court not to allow the start of the limitations period until it is
discovered that a death has in fact occurred. In some wrongful death
claims, where the death occurred in secret, the actual tortfeasor's
identity may not be known with enough certainty to file suit. In those
situations, the discovery rule operates to commence the running of the
limitations period on the day when the plaintiff becomes aware, or
should have become aware, of both the fact of the victim's death and
the identity of the defendant.9 8
C. Statutes of Limitations in Federal Courts
The general rule regarding statutes of limitations in federal
diversity of citizenship cases is that the court applies the statutory
period determined by the state law where the claim is filed.99 While a
civil action begins on the day it is filed,' 0 expiration of the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that relies on factual issues not
raised in the complaint.' Federal courts may raise a statute of
limitations defense sua sponte at the threshold of a suit when dismissal
would not unfairly prejudice either party. 2 The application of a
statute of limitations is a question of law for the court to decide, not
the jury. 0 3
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when adjudicating statute
of limitations problems, federal courts should generally apply the state
law where the district court is located, unless federal law provides a
closer analogy and better serves federal interests. 0 4
[W]e decline to follow a state limitations period only when a rule
from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and when federal policies at stake
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Chile, Thematic Reports, Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/43, available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/vol14/chiletr.htm (last
visited July 22, 2003). "The disappeared" has now taken on the general meaning of "people who
have been killed by a government or army, usually for political reasons, and whose bodies have
not been found." Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary (Cambridge University Press 2003),
available at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=22042&dict=CALD (last visited
Sept. 1, 2003).
98. See LEVY, supra note 58, § 8.12, at 333-34.
99. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 46, § 5:25, at 871.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." Id.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " Id.
102. Pifio v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
103. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 779 (9th Cir. 1996).
104. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995).
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and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."'
In general, if a federal statute provides a cause of action without
specifying a limitations period, federal courts will first look to borrow
the limitations period of an analogous statute from the state where the
court is located." 6 If a cause of action arises in a foreign country, and
by the laws of that country the action cannot be maintained because of
lapse of time, then an action cannot be maintained against a defendant
in the forum state. 7 However, in an exception to that rule, the cause
of action will not be time barred if it is in favor of the forum state's
citizen or resident.'0 8
If a federal civil rights statute does not provide a limitations
period, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs the courts to borrow one from the
most analogous state statute. 09  The state's limitations period,
however, must not "frustrate or interfere with the implementation of
national policies ... or be at odds with the purpose or operation of
federal substantive law.""'  In order to determine whether to apply a
federal or state limitations period, courts must examine the closest
applicable and analogous statutes under both federal and state law."'
The difficulty in determining which state or federal limitations period
is most analogous can lead to problems for both courts and parties112
One commentator has asserted justly deserved criticism of the
borrowing doctrines, claiming that "borrowing has led to confusion,
105. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (state limitations period for
personal injury claims applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims).
107. LEVY, supra note 58, § 2.05, at 38.
108. Id. § 2.06, at 39.
109. Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 WL 1913936, at*5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2002). 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) provides as follows:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts ... for
the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
110. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34.
111. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1547 ("[W]here a rule from elsewhere in federal law provides a
closer analogy than available state statutes ... a federal limitations period may better bridge the
gap.").
112. Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limitations
by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 455 (1993).
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lack of uniformity, inequitable administration of federal rights, unfair
surprise to litigants, and unnecessary waste of judicial time and
resources." 1 3
There have been recent suggestions to apply the ATCA to torts
resulting from foreign environmental damage caused by construction
and natural resource extraction projects. 4 An examination of current
federal environmental statutes reveals that the Clean Air Act,11 the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),'16 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)," 7 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)"8 lack statutes of limitations for the express
rights of action for civil penalties." 9 Many courts have found that
citizen suits brought under these statutes are governed by a general
five-year statute of limitations.12
There are some circumstances in federal law under which no
limitations period may be asserted. When hearing a claim bound
neither by a specific statute of limitations nor by any generally
applicable statute of limitations, some courts have held that claims
brought by the United States are not time barred at all. 2' In addition,
there are no statutes of limitations for federal criminal capital offenses
or for fugitives from justice. "' Similarly, there is no limitations period
in prosecutions for murder committed in conjunction with the crime
of genocide.'23 Because no statute of limitations exists for genocidal
murder, plaintiffs may be able to litigate civil tort claims based on the
113. Id.
114. See generally Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under ATCA: A Practical
Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1995).
116. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2001).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1995).
118. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
119. MacAyeal, supra note 49, at 593.
120. Id. at 593 n.25.
121. Id. at 594 n.27.
122. 1 CORMAN, supra note 46, § 1.6, at 117-18.
123. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No.
100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000)), states in pertinent part:
(a) Basic Offense.-Whoever, in time of peace or in time of war ... and with the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group as such (1) kills members of that group ... shall be punished ....
(e) Non-Applicability of Certain Limitations . . . [I]n the case of an offense under
subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be found, or an information instituted, at any
time without limitation.
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crime of genocide even if the acts occurred so long ago that other
claims are no longer viable.'24
Under federal law, equitable tolling is available where the
defendant's wrongful conduct prevents the plaintiff from asserting his
or her claim, or where extraordinary circumstances outside the
plaintiffs control make it impossible to assert the claim in a timely
manner.125  The U.S. Supreme Court in Rotella v. Wood126 discussed
the application of equitable tolling to federal statutes when Justice
Souter noted, "[W]e do not unsettle the understanding that Federal
statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable principles of
tolling .... 127
For example, in an ATCA claim against the estate of former
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, the Ninth Circuit applied
equitable tolling because of the extraordinary circumstances outside
the plaintiffs' control, which resulted in fear of intimidation and
reprisal. 128 ATCA claims for injury from torture, disappearance, and
summary execution were tolled until the date that Marcos had left
office. 129 Similarly, plaintiffs claims may toll as long as the oppressive
military government remains in power if he can show that he is unable
to obtain access to judicial review in the foreign country. 3°
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO ATCA CLAIMS
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not reviewed any lower
court ruling relating to the proper limitations period for the ATCA. 13'
Since the ATCA contains no explicit statute of limitations, federal
courts have used four different options for setting a limitations period.
First, they may borrow from the closest analogous federal statute;
second, they may borrow from the forum state's statute of limitations;
third, they may apply the limitations period of international law; or
fourth, they may apply the law of the foreign country where the act
124. See Herz, supra note 28, at 609 n.365. This reference points out one case, Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), where the court found a clear distinction between
setting the length of criminal versus civil statutes of limitations (with the court holding that civil
limitations periods for genocidal torts under international law should be shorter than criminal
limitations periods, id. at 1430-31). But the public policy issues involved in prevention of
genocide are so overwhelming that setting no limitations period for both civil and criminal cases
makes much more sense than applying a very short civil limitations period.
125. Unocal II, 176 F.R.D. 329, 360 (C.C. Cal. 1997).
126. 528 U.S. 549 (2000) (limiting tolling of RICO statute of limitations).
127. Id. at 559.
128. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996).
129. Id.
130. See Unocal II, 176 F.R.D. at 360.
131. Seeid. at 359.
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occurred. 132 If a court "views [ATCA] as providing a right of action
or as opening the federal courts to claims based on international law as
part of federal common law, the court will most likely 'borrow' from
the most analogous federal or state statute.' ' 133 However, "[i]f the
court views an ATCA claim as a transitory tort which is in federal
court pursuant to a jurisdictional grant, but is defined by
international, state, or foreign law, it will apply the statute of
limitations established by that body of law.' 1 34 Tolling provisions of
the state where the federal court is located are generally also borrowed
in determining how tolling rules are to be applied under ATCA
claims. 13
This Part provides examples of the various ways that courts have
applied statute of limitations law to specific ATCA claims. Section A
describes how the courts determined ATCA limitations periods before
Congress passed the TVPA in 1991.136 Over time, it is apparent that
more courts are analogizing to the TVPA and applying its ten-year
limitations period. Section B details how the TVPA added to ATCA
jurisprudence, and Section C describes how ATCA statute of
limitations law has been influenced by the TVPA since its passage.
Analogizing the ATCA to the TVPA has not been universally
adopted, and this policy is subject to change if higher courts overturn
the earlier decisions.
A. The ATCA Before the Torture Victim Protection Act
Not all ATCA claims have been successful. In some of these
failures, the statute of limitations had long since passed before the
plaintiffs got to court. For example, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic'37 was brought several years after a vicious attack by
Palestinian terrorists on an Israeli bus. Survivors and personal
representatives of the deceased brought an ATCA claim against the
terrorists and their supporters in the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia. 3 ' Examining District of Columbia law in order
to apply a statute of limitations, the court decided the alleged acts were
intentional torts, subject to a one-year limitations period, rather than
132. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 148 (1996).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 n.31 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)).
137. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 544.
Seattle University Law Review
unintentional torts, which had a three-year limitations period. 3 9 The
court found that application of the one-year limitations period would
not suppress federal policies and values underlying international
law. 40 The suit was ultimately dismissed because the statute of
limitations had run and there was a lack of federal question
jurisdiction. 4'
Determining the limitations period before the TVPA was passed
in 1991 was an exercise fraught with complications. Forti v. Suarez-
Mason'42 is a good example of the complexity the courts faced in
determining a suitable limitations period before the TVPA. In this
case, Argentinean police and military officials acting under
Argentinean General Suarez-Mason's command severely violated the
human rights of the two plaintiffs in 1977. In one act, the officials
seized plaintiff Alfredo Forti, along with his mother and four brothers,
and held them in a detention center without charges being filed.'
The five sons were released after a short time, but their mother was
never released, and remains missing despite extensive efforts to find
her."' In the other act, sixteen-year old plaintiff Debora Benchoam
and her older brother were both abducted from their Buenos Aires
home in July 1977 by plainclothes military authorities. 4 5  The
brother's severely disfigured body was returned to the family the next
day. 146  During her first week in detention, Debora Benchoam was
kept blindfolded with her hands handcuffed behind her back,
provided neither food nor clothing, while a guard attempted to rape
her. 147 After a month of being held incommunicado, she was sent
without charge to a prison for over four years; it was only after
numerous domestic and international human rights appeals were made
that she was released from prison and admitted to the United States as
a refugee.141
In 1984, the regime changed in Argentina, and Suarez-Mason
fled to the United States. 149 He was arrested in California in January
1987 at the request of the Republic of Argentina. While he was in
custody awaiting an extradition hearing, plaintiffs served their
139. Id. at 550-51.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 551.
142. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).






149. Id. at 1536.
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complaint alleging torture; prolonged arbitrary detention without trial;
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault
and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; causing the
disappearance of individuals; murder and summary execution;
wrongful death; and a survival action."O
The court found the claims were not time barred.'51 It first
examined the Jones Act" 2 as an analogous federal statute that, like the
ATCA, does not have a limitations provision.'53 Although Jones Act
claims are governed by the limitations period of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act,"5 4 the court held the Jones Act was not as
applicable to this ATCA claim as was the underlying state tort law.155
The court noted that the federal statute most analogous to the ATCA
was the Civil Rights Act of 1871,156 but since that Act also does not
contain an express limitations period, the statute of limitations period
would have to be borrowed from underlying state tort law.' 57
The court further reasoned that the applicable statute of
limitations should not be borrowed from Argentina's law. 58 The
court implied that applying the limitation periods of foreign nations
would not promote the public policy of providing a forum for redress
of violations of internationally recognized human rights, as foreign
nations may not have a similar interest in promoting human rights. 59
Therefore, because federal law did not provide an appropriate
limitations period and adopting a foreign limitations period would not
promote public policy, the court applied California's one-year statute
150. Id. at 1538.
151. Id.at1551.
152. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688.
153. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1548. The Jones Act is analogous because it provides federal
court access to non-U.S. citizens, the same class of plaintiffs that are served by the ATCA. The"
Jones Act (46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a)) states:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and
in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and
in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall 'be
applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
154. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1986). "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless
commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued ..... Id.
155. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1548.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
157. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1548.
158. Id. at 1549.
159. See id. at 1548-49.
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of limitations for personal injury actions. 6' Since the alleged acts
occurred in 1977 (and continued until 1981 in the case of defendant
Benchoam), and the action was brought in 1987, the claims would all
have been time barred under California's statute of limitation, unless
the principle of equitable tolling could be applied.' The court held
the limitations period was indeed tolled from 1977 to 1984 because of
plaintiffs' likely inability to gain effective access to Argentine courts
during that period.'62 The military government in power at that time
would have effectively prevented bringing a successful suit.'63 The
court also held that the period when the defendant was "in hiding"
from 1984 to 1987 was also tolled.'64 Because plaintiffs raised issues of
equitable tolling from 1977 to 1987, the court held the ATCA claim
was not time barred. 65
As the foregoing example illustrates, ATCA statute of
limitations jurisprudence was in a rather confusing state of affairs
before 1991. In that year, however, passage of the TVPA provided a
foundation upon which courts could find a near-perfect analogous law
from which to borrow for resolving ATCA statute of limitations
questions.
B. The Torture Victim Protection Act
Filartiga166 prompted Congress to pass the TVPA in order to
mitigate the effects of torture on its victims. 167 Unlike the ATCA, the
TVPA provides an express ten-year statute of limitations. 68  This
period was selected because it "insures that the Federal Courts will not
have to hear stale claims.' 1 9 The U.S. Senate report on the TVPA
cited examples of situations where equitable tolling should be applied
to TVPA claims. 70  These situations include the period when the
defendant had immunity, concealed his whereabouts, or was absent
from the United States or any jurisdiction in which such a suit could
have been filed, or during the period when the plaintiff was
160. Id. at 1549.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1549-50.
163. Id. at 1550.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1550-51.
166. 630 F.2d at 884-85 (holding that official torture is prohibited by the law of nations).
167. Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From Universal
Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 109 (2001).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). The TVPA § 2(c) states in pertinent part, "No action
shall be maintained ... unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose."
169. H. R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
170. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 11 (1991).
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imprisoned, incapacitated, or unable to discover the identity of the
offender. 171
The TVPA does not supercede the ATCA, as the Senate report
expressly stated that the ATCA "has other important uses and should
not be replaced."' 7 2  The House of Representatives report on the
TVPA noted that claims "based on torture or summary executions do
not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by
[the ATCA]. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based
on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules
of customary international law."'7 Courts have since interpreted the
TVPA as expanding, rather than limiting, the provisions of the
ATCA. 17
4
C. ATCA Claims Since Passage of the TVPA
Although the Supreme Court has not decided the question of the
correct limitations period for ATCA claims, it is now well established
in several lower courts that the ten-year TVPA statute of limitations
applies to ATCA claims. 7  Federal courts apply the TVPA
limitations period to ATCA claims because such "claims require
careful examination of the international obligations of the United
States and often entail preparation that would be stymied by requiring
imposition of the time restrictions of state tort actions.' 176
Application of a borrowed limitations period for ATCA suits has
sometimes worked in favor of plaintiffs; however, at other times it has
worked against them. For example, in Xuncax v. Gramajo7 7 the
limitations period worked to the plaintiffs benefit. Guatemalan
natives, forced to flee their country as a direct result of torture,
arbitrary detention, and being forced to watch as their family members
were tortured to death or summarily executed, recovered
compensatory and punitive damages against Guatemala's former
Minister of Defense. 178 All of the plaintiffs asserted that they suffered
from severe psychological disorders and disturbances due to the brutal
nature of the traumas inflicted on them. 179  Under international,
171. Id.
172. Id. at4.
173. H. R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
174. See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1194-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
175. Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 WL 1913936, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2002). See, e.g., Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002); Cabiri, 921 F.
Supp. at 1195-96.
176. Manliguez, 2002 WL 1913936, at *6.
177. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
178. Id. at 169.
179. Id.
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federal, and municipal tort laws, their claims were found not time
barred after the court examined the statutes of limitations of state law,
state borrowing statutes, Guatemalan law, and the TVPA."8 '
Xuncax left open the question of whether the limitations period
of Massachusetts or the TVPA would apply. The court initially
applied the three-year Massachusetts statute of limitations for
personal injury, and the Massachusetts borrowing statute for
nonresidents. 8 ' However, an exception to the Massachusetts
borrowing rule states a cause of action is limited by laws of the
resident's country (in this case Guatemala, which allowed plaintiffs
twenty years to bring a suit).'82 Because the plaintiffs brought suit
within three years of the date that the defendant entered the state, the
court found the action was timely under Massachusetts law. 83
Analogizing to federal statutes with an express limitations period, the
court found plaintiffs' claims were also timely under the TVPA, with
its ten-year limitations period.184 Thus, Xuncax declined to identify
the proper test for determining a statute of limitations, further
illustrating the uncertainty in ATCA statute of limitations
jurisprudence.
The passage of the TVPA raised an interesting question
regarding retroactive application of the limitations period to cases in
which the tort occurred before passage of the TVPA. In Cabiri v.
Assasie-Gyimah,8 5 the court applied the TVPA's ten-year limitations
period to an ATCA claim despite the fact that the claim had accrued
prior to the passage of the TVPA.' 86 Cabiri, an alien from the
Republic of Ghana, accused the Ghanaian Deputy Chief of National
Security with subjecting him to ongoing physical and mental abuse
during interrogation, including beatings, electric shocks, and
threatening his life when his answers were not satisfactory.'87 Even
though the alleged events took place prior to the enactment of the
TVPA, the court found that the retroactive application of the
limitations period of the TVPA was entirely proper in this case,
because the defendant had fair notice that torture was not a lawful
act. 188
180. Idat 192-93.
181. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 9 (1982) (limitations period does not begin to run until
the defendant enters the state).
182. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 192.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 192-93.
185. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
186. Id. at 1194-96.
187. Id. at 1191.
188. Id. at 1195-96.
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Not all courts in the post-TVPA period applied the TVPA
statute of limitations to ATCA claims. In some cases, the court
declined to impose the TVPA limitations period, instead holding that
equitable tolling operated to keep the limitations period from running.
For example, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,'89 the court declined to
decide whether the TVPA limitations period applied to an ATCA
claim.1 90 In 1991, the district court certified the case as a class action,
defining the class as all Philippine civilian citizens who were tortured,
summarily executed, or "disappeared" by Philippine military or
paramilitary groups between 1972 and 1986; the class also included
the survivors of deceased class members. 9 The court discussed
applying the various statute of limitations possibilities open to it,
including the limitations period provided by state law, Philippine law,
and the TVPA. 9 2  The court declined to find which statute of
limitations was appropriate, since equitable tolling principles
applied.193
Doe v. Unocal Corp. 9' is another good example of this principle.
Burmese plaintiffs alleged that Unocal had violated international law
while constructing an oil pipeline in Burma, when it used the local
military, intelligence, and police forces, to intimidate and relocate
whole villages, enslave farmers, kill family members, commit assault,
rape, torture, and steal homes and property. 95 While plaintiffs argued
that the TVPA provided the closest federal analogy, defendants
contended that the complaint did not support equitable tolling for the
alleged claims.'96 The court, in declining to decide whether the TVPA
limitations period applied, held that plaintiffs' claims tolled as long as
the Burmese military government remained in power and plaintiffs
were unable to obtain access to judicial review.' 97
On the other hand, in Japanese Forced Labor,98 equitable tolling
did not to apply to Korean and Chinese survivors of the brutal
Japanese slave labor camps during World War 11.99 Since the claim
189. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
190. Id. at 773.
191. Id. at 771.
192. Id. at 773.
193. Id.
194. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on other grounds,
27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
195. Id. at 883.
196. Id. at 897.
197. Id.
198. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
199. Id. at 1181-82. During World War II, to alleviate an acute labor shortage, Japan
forced thousands of prisoners to work under horrendous conditions in mining, munitions,
construction, and other tasks in aid of the Japanese war effort. See Sean D. Murphy,
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was filed in California, the federal court examined California personal
injury law (e.g., false imprisonment), and found such tort actions have
a one-year statute of limitations. °0 Searching for the closest federal
statute was relatively easy for the court, given the similarity between
forced labor and torture.2°' It concluded that the TVPA was the
closest federal statute to the ATCA in this case.20 2 Since the Korean
and Chinese plaintiffs were aware of their injuries by 1945 at the
latest, and these cases were initiated in 1999 and 2000, the court held
the claims were well outside the ten-year limitations period and, as
plaintiffs provided no reasons for tolling the limitations period, the
claims were dismissed as time barred.0 3
As the courts became more familiar with the TVPA, the
limitations period of that statute was applied more frequently. In
Papa v. United States, °4 an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) detainee killed Mauricio Papa, a Brazilian citizen, while he was
in INS custody after illegally entering the United States in 1991.205
The court summarized the reasons for applying the TVPA's statute of
limitations to the survivors' ATCA claim, rather than that of the state
in which the claim was filed.
The TVPA, like the ATCA, furthers the protection of human
rights and helps "carry out obligations of the United States
under the United Nations Charter and other international
agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights."
Moreover, it employs a similar mechanism for carrying out these
goals: civil actions. The provisions of the TVPA were added to
the ATCA, further indicating the close relationship between the
two statutes. All these factors point towards borrowing the
TVPA's statute of limitations for the ATCA. In addition, the
realities of litigating claims brought under the ATCA, and the
federal interest in providing a remedy, also point towards
adopting a uniform-and a generous-statute of limitations.
The nature of the violations suffered by those the ATCA, like
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM J. INT'L L. 132,
139-40 (2001). Several lawsuits were filed in California courts on behalf of these prisoners, but
most were removed to federal court and consolidated into a single action. Id. at 140. The
defendants included Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui and Company, and Nippon Steel
Corporation. Id.
200. Japanese Forced Labor, 164 F. Supp. 2d. at 1180.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1181-82.
204. 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002).
205. Id. at 1008.
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the TVPA, was designed to protect will tend to preclude filings
in United States courts within a short time. 20 6
Returning to our discussion of the Iwanowa case,20 7 the court
held that Iwanowa's ATCA claims were time barred because two
applicable post-World War II treaties governing reparations0 8 had
not prevented Iwanowa from bringing timely forced labor claims
against Ford.209  Iwanowa argued that the statute of limitations
equitably tolled from the end of the War until 1998 by Ford's
affirmative misstatements denying that it had gained any economic
advantages from Ford Werke's use of forced labor. 210  In granting
Ford's motion to dismiss, however, the court held that no allegations
of misrepresentation or concealment in Iwanowa's original complaint,
therefore barring her theory of equitable tolling. In short, Iwanowa
could have sued Ford under the ATCA at any time after the War
ended, but having failed to do so, her claim against Ford was time
barred.212
On the other hand, the court held Iwanowa's international law
claims against Ford Werke were not time barred under the doctrine of
equitable tolling. 21 3 The Paris Reparations Treaty214 tolled the statute
of limitations on War-related claims against Ford Werke from 1946
until 1953, when it was replaced by the London Debt Agreement,1 5
which tolled the limitations period on such claims until 1991.216
Because ATCA has no set statute of limitations, the court then
applied the TVPA's ten-year limitations period.2 17 By filing her suit
on March 5, 1998, Iwanowa's claims against Ford Werke were held to
be timely. 218 Nevertheless, the court granted Ford's motion to dismiss
206. Id. at 1012 (internal citations omitted).
207. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.NJ. 1999).
208. See Agreement on Reparations from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-
Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157,
T.I.A.S. 1655 [hereinafter Paris Reparations Treaty]; Agreement on German External Debts,
Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter London Debt Agreement].
209. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 466-68.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 468.
212. Russell A Miller, Much Ado, But Nothing: California's New World War II Slave Labor
Law Statute of Limitations and Its Place in the Increasingly Futile Effort to Obtain Compensations
from American Courts, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 121, 130 (2001).
213. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
214. See Paris Reparations Treaty, supra note 208.
215. See London Debt Agreement, supra note 208.
216. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
217. Id. at 462.
218. Id. at 466.
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on other substantive grounds.219  Because of the intense pressure
directed at German and Austrian companies and Swiss banks by
Iwanowa and related litigation, a fund to compensate slave laborers has
been established; payments totaling $2.85 billion have been made to
the claimants as of November 2002.220
In an interesting development that may foreshadow a possible
future direction for ATCA litigation, some federal courts have
recognized that the ATCA may be applicable to international
environmental torts. 221 In addition, international law may be moving
in the direction of recognition of environmental rights. 222  Because
some types of environmental degradation may take many years to
show observable harm,223 it is probable that at least some of the
harmful effects of an environmental tortfeasor's acts would not be
discoverable until many years after the act has occurred. Unless
equitable tolling or discovery rules apply, some types of environmental
degradation actions with long periods before the degree of harm is
apparent could be time barred.
If, as proposed by this Comment, Congress amends the ATCA
to provide a fixed limitations period, it would be equally important to
expressly provide that equitable tolling principles and the discovery
rule apply.
IV. AMENDING THE ATCA TO INCLUDE A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Before proposing an amendment to the ATCA, it is necessary to
examine and evaluate the efficacy of adopting some of proposed
statutory schemes for dealing with previous statute of limitations
problems. Even if the Supreme Court were to settle the matter
219. Id. at 491. The claims against Ford Werke for violations of international law were not
granted because the London Debt Agreement contemplated that individual claims against
German companies would be pursued by way of government-to-government negotiations, not
private litigation. Id.
220. See Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative
Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11, 23-24 (2002); Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections
on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 799 (2002).
221. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRAN, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. La.
1997), affd 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (alleging mining operations had harmed the
surrounding environment; dismissed because environmental treaties cited by plaintiff were
insufficient sources of international law to support an ATCA claim); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.
142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (alleging oil company improperly disposed of waste and
had pipeline leaks, resulting in environmental damage; dismissed on grounds of improper
jurisdiction).
222. See Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy
Environment in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 MiSS. L.J. 565, 602 (1998).
223. See generally id. at 579-81.
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judicially, Congress should amend the ATCA to add a clear statute of
limitations provision to remove any future uncertainty about what
limit should apply. This Part discusses the various elements of this
thesis. Section A examines the arguments against having Congress set
a fixed limitations period for the ATCA, and Section B provides
arguments in favor of amending the statute. Section C examines and
evaluates some of the alternatives for setting an ATCA statute of
limitations, while Section D provides a summary of the elements the
proposed amendment should contain.
A. Arguments Against Amending the A TCA
There are several reasons that could be offered to maintain the
status quo and not amend the ATCA to add an express limitations
period. First, while state tort statutes of limitations may vary, they are
still relatively uniform and easily ascertainable.224 Nevertheless, while
U.S. courts may be familiar with borrowing and analogizing from
other statutes, international plaintiffs might be confused by the
uncertain statute of limitations, thereby missing an opportunity to file
otherwise valid claims.
Second, since Congress passed the TVPA in 1992, many courts
have adopted the ten-year limitations period for ATCA claims, thus
negating the need for an amendment. However, borrowing the TVPA
limitations period has not been adopted by all courts or approved by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, as judicial common law,
analogizing to the TVPA may not stand the test of time.
Third, opening up the law for amendment could provide some
potential parties with the impetus to kill it completely. There is
currently an effort underway to exclude overseas U.S. corporate
activity from the ATCA.225 By opening up ATCA in order to amend
it for a fixed statute of limitations, Congressional opponents of ATCA
corporate liability would likely use the opportunity to gut the law,
given the strongly pro-business bent of the current Congress.
The Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade
Council, the National Association of Manufacturers and others
have the [ATCA] on their "tort reform" agendas ....
"I think there's enough there to show this statute can make a lot
of mischief in the wrong hands," said Paul Kamenar, senior
224. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
225. See Marcia Coyle, 9th Circuit Spurns U.S. over Alien Tort Claims, The National Law
Journal News, June 9, 2003, at http://www.nlj.com/news/060903claims.shtml (last visited July
2, 2003).
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executive counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation. "It
represents a larger problem with activist courts trying to take a
statute from 1789 never intended to be used against
multinational corporations. ,226
This attack on the ATCA is essentially political, rather than
strictly legal, and represents an insufficient reason to avoid examining
the statute of limitations problems addressed in this Comment.
Making the ATCA more accessible might lead some plaintiffs to
unfairly target U.S. firms as defendants simply by their presence in
countries at the time when human rights abuses had occurred.227
However, without evidence of complicity by the U.S. corporation with
the alleged abuses, the claim could not be filed without risking
sanctions.
Finally, some might argue that if the ATCA were made easier to
understand and use, many more claims might be brought, possibly
overwhelming federal courts. The solution to such a concern should
be to examine the level of support given to the federal court system,
rather than using an uncertain limitations period to keep court
calendars unclogged.
B. Arguments Supporting Amendment of the A TCA
There are much stronger reasons why the ATCA should be
amended in order to clear up the current uncertainty. First, state tort
laws and their generally short limitations periods for filing personal
injury claims do not generally account for the horrendous nature of
many tort claims brought under the ATCA. Second, the nature of the
tort itself can cause plaintiffs such extreme fear and humiliation that
they are effectively deterred from filing claims for redress for
extremely long periods. Third, torts committed outside the United
States present serious barriers to effectively filing ATCA claims.
Fourth, federal courts are burdened when they have to spend precious
judicial resources in determining the appropriate limitations period for
each case. Fifth, because it takes a long time for many types of
environmental damage to become apparent, these types of ATCA
claims may require a longer limitations period. Finally, because the
United States is seen by much of the world as a last resort fighting
injustice, ATCA should be restructured so that victims of human
226. Id.
227. See John E. Howard, The "Alien Tort Claims Act": Is Our Litigation -Run -Amok Going
Global?, at http://www.usaengage.org/news/2OO2/sep/howardoped.html (last visited March
19, 2003).
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rights abuses have a forum to hear their claims. This Section
addresses these reasons for amending the ATCA in detail.
1. State Tort Limitations Periods Do Not Adequately Address These
Types of Torts
Foreign torts litigated under the ATCA are often much more
severe than any anticipated by the states when they passed their own
statute of limitations laws. For example, in Kadic v. Karadzic, 28 the
claims included torts committed under genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, torture, summary execution, forced prostitution,
and forced pregnancy.229 The Xuncax court, when examining the
severity of the human rights abuses that it was reviewing, questioned"the appropriateness of using a municipal wrongful death statute to
address summary executions or 'disappearances."23 It is unlikely that
most states had ever considered these types of acts in formulating their
relatively short limitations period for personal injury actions.
The current state statutory limitations periods for personal injury
torts, generally ranging from one to four years, are inappropriate for a
person who has been subjected to physically damaging torture or slave
labor. In Xuncax, the judge stated that torture and disappearances
were unfamiliar concepts in municipal law, which is "ill-tailored for
cases grounded on violations of the law of nations." '231 Under these
circumstances, it does not serve the cause of justice to allow the
tortfeasors any repose by setting a short limitations period.
2. Many ATCA Claimants Are Reluctant or Unable to File Timely
Claims
Individuals who are tortured, raped, or forced to watch as family
members are executed are often forever psychologically scarred. The
effects of such treatment are as much designed to create a deep sense
of fear, humiliation, and self-hatred, as they are to extract information
from or hurt the victims. Few potential plaintiffs could be expected to
recover enough physically or mentally in the short period of a few
years to be able to file a claim. For example, some of the Xuncax
plaintiffs who were tortured or forced to watch as their family
members were tortured to death or summarily executed claimed to
228. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
229. Id. at 236-37.
230. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183, n.24 (D. Mass. 1995).
231. Id. at 192.
219
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suffer from subsequent severe psychological disorders and
disturbances.232
There are numerous recorded instances where victims of severe
abuse will rarely speak to anyone else about what they have endured or
witnessed. For example, in a situation that did not lead to an ATCA
claim, one young girl who was arrested and tortured by Nicaraguan
authorities during the Sandinista revolt in 1976 provided a chilling
account of why such individuals will not readily speak about their
experiences, let alone file suit.
It was such a shock... I couldn't even cry. I went blank. They
asked me questions and beat me. I saw other prisoners being
tortured. When I was in the patrol car my sister managed to tell
me to say I didn't know anything. As soon as we got to the
Security office they separated us and forced hoods over our
heads. Later they stuck me in the cold room. I heard moans
and realized I was there with two half-naked comrades who were
covered with blood .... My experience at the jail affected me for
a long time. I was afraid when I saw comrades or when I saw
guards. 233
Sometimes the victims feel that because they did not resist
enough, the treatment they had received was their own fault, resulting
in a sense of humiliation, with a consequent reluctance to see the
tortfeasors as the ones who are actually at fault. Primo Levy, the
noted chronicler of life and death in the German concentration camps,
eloquently expressed the deep shame felt by newly arriving Russian
prisoners, destined for slave labor or worse:
They did not greet us, nor smile; they seemed oppressed, not
only by pity but also by a confused restraint which sealed their
mouths, and kept their eyes fastened on the funeral scene. It
was the same shame which we knew so well, which submerged
us after the selections, and every time we had to witness or
undergo an outrage. .. the shame which the just man
experiences when confronted by a crime committed by another,
and he feels remorse because of its existence, because of its
having been irrevocably introduced into the world of existing
things, and because his will has proven nonexistent or feeble and
was incapable of putting up a good defense.234
232. Seeid. at 169.
233. MARGARET RANDALL, SANDINO'S DAUGHTERS: TESTIMONIES OF NICARAGUAN
WOMEN IN STRUGGLE 192 (Linda Yanz ed., 1981).
234. PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 72-73 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Summit Books 1988) (1986).
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In short, many human rights abuse victims suffer so profoundly
that they are robbed of their normal human desire to redress the
wrongs that have been visited upon them. They are left only with an
emotional void, unable to relive the horror they have endured and
consequently, unable to file suit for damages.
In a related type of abuse situation, that of children who are
sexually abused, their trauma is often accompanied by a repression of
the memory of their abuse.23 These victims often do not realize the
extent of their psychological injuries until they are fully-grown and
seek psychological treatment for other disorders or upset.236
Therefore, the majority of states with statutes of limitations for
criminal prosecutions have adopted a specific extension of the time
limit for filing civil actions based on child sexual abuse.237 Other
states allow a common law extension of the statute of limitations based
on the discovery doctrine.238
It is entirely possible that even the ten-year TVPA limitations
period frequently borrowed in ATCA cases may not be long enough
for some victims of human rights abuse to be willing to talk about
what they have endured, let alone to get up the courage to initiate a
lawsuit against their former tormentors.
3. The Complexity of ATCA Claims Prevents Timely Filing
The very fact that most modern ATCA claims occur overseas to
foreign citizens means that they will have serious difficulties in
bringing timely claims. While the normal rules of notice inherent in
the U.S. legal system imply that a reasonably intelligent person can
learn the applicable limitations period, ATCA plaintiffs, aliens by
definition, cannot reasonably be expected to understand the complex
rules governing ATCA limitations. Foreign attorneys, whom the
victims might be expected to seek initially for advice, would be
similarly hampered by the difficulty in understanding these rules.
Added to these barriers are the current visa and immigration
difficulties inherent in even gaining entry into the United States, a
precondition to effectively pressing their claims. Therefore, it may be
close to impossible for an alien, unable to speak or read English,
unfamiliar with the confusing ATCA limitations jurisprudence,
235. See National Centers for the Victims of Crime, Extensions of the Criminal & Civil
Statutes of Limitations in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, available at http://dev.ncvc.org/gethelp/
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fearful of reprisals, and humiliated and physically weak from her
treatment, to be able to file a claim within a relatively short period.
There may also be very difficult evidentiary problems in
bringing an ATCA claim. Foreign witnesses are not readily
obtainable, and if found, are often reluctant to speak out on the
plaintiffs' behalf, fearing their own "disappearance." '239 Physical and
documentary evidence will likely reside primarily in the foreign
country, often under the very control of those with no interest in
seeing a claim succeed. Such evidence may be especially difficult to
obtain when a plaintiff attempts to prove international violations were
inflicted by persons operating under the defendant's command.24 °
4. Courts Are Burdened by the Need to Determine the Appropriate
Limitations Period
When courts have to borrow and apply the appropriate
limitations period, there is likely some difficulty and attendant waste
of judicial resources.241 An amendment fixing the statutory period
would ease the burden on federal courts to research and apply
analogous statutes. At least one commentator has suggested that since
the First Congress had a much narrower understanding of the ATCA
than is being applied today, courts "should await additional legislative
direction before allowing the [ATCA] to be expanded any further."242
Courts should also be provided with an express statute of
limitations so that they do not have to incur the burden of taking a
position on long-distant past events. Asking a court to decide such
claims means that it is unlikely the judges would have as much
familiarity with the issue as a contemporaneous court would have had.
For example, in Iwanowa, it is improbable that the 1999 court
deciding the case had the same perspective on the traumatic events of
World War II that a 1949 court would have had.
239. See Juan E. Mendez & Jose Miguel Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American
Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507, 543 (1990).
240. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human
Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 247, 258 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537-38 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). In Forti, the plaintiff alleged that although the defendant's individual acts were
committed by military and police officials, these individuals were all agents, employees, or
representatives of the defendant "acting pursuant to a 'policy, pattern and practice' of the First
Army Corps under defendant's command" and that defendant "'authorized, approved, directed
and ratified' the acts" listed in the complaint). Id.
241. See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations:
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 455 (1993).
242. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 647
(2002).
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5. Environmental Damage May Take a Long Time to Become
Apparent
Because it often takes substantial time for the full extent of
environmental harm to be demonstrated,243 ATCA claims involving
environmental damage may require a longer limitations period than
that required for personal injury torts. While the discovery rule
would be useful in allowing future claims to be made long after the
actual event, there are still many environmental and human health
effects that only become apparent long after the initial harm is
discovered. For example, if a mining project filled a river with
contaminants, a potential claim would accrue as soon as dying fish
were discovered. If health effects to the humans eating the fish took a
long time to become apparent, that future harm might become non-
litigable if the initial claim has to be filed within a relatively short
period after discovery of the initial harm.
While environmental damage claims have not to date been
generally recognized as an internationally recognized tort,244 it is
reasonable to expect that someday they will be so recognized.245 If that
were to occur, it would be critical to have a longer limitations period
fixed by statute. In addition, courts may be reluctant to analogize
ATCA environmental damage claims to the TVPA, which only
covers damages relating to torture and summary execution.246
6. The United States Has a Long Tradition of Preventing Unjust
Treatment Abroad
The United States is often looked upon in the world as a last
resort for righting injustices and wrongs committed by brutal,
dictatorial regimes. Use of the ATCA and the TVPA by foreign
victims "provides a voice for victims of human rights atrocities and a
forum to hear their claims. 247 To the degree that there are limitations
243. See Herz, supra note 28, at 609.
244. Beanal v. Freeport -McMoRAN, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. La. 1997), affd
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
245. See Herz, supra note 28, at 549.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). The TVPA states in pertinent part:
§ 2. Establishment of civil action.
(a) Liability.-An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation-(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial
killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.
247. William J. Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: An Overview of
Transnational Law Litigation, 49-JUN FED. LAW. 33, 38 (2002).
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to this type of litigation, the U.S. Congress should develop
mechanisms to ensure that future efforts to obtain justice from
international torts are uniformly successful.
For the above reasons, Congress should amend the ATCA to
provide sufficient time for potential plaintiffs to overcome their
substantial physical, psychological, and evidentiary barriers and file a
claim in a federal court. It could even be argued that the ATCA
should be amended because the current situation is also unfair to some
defendants, who have little certainty as to when they may achieve
repose from potential claims. The next question, however, is
somewhat more difficult to answer, namely how long should the
amended statute of limitations be?
C. Alternatives for Setting a Statute of Limitations
Deciding on a "one size fits all" limitations period is quite
difficult, because it is not possible to anticipate the wide variety of
claims that could be brought under the ATCA. However, it would be
better to set a fixed period, even if it is too short to cover adequately
every situation that comes up, than to have no certain period at all.
This raises the thorny question of what statutory period to
recommend to Congress. Over the years, there have been several
solutions proposed or implemented for solving this type of problem
under similar circumstances. First, Congress could apply an express
statute of limitations to all federal laws that do not have one expressly
attached. Second, it could extend the TVPA ten-year period to all
ATCA claims. Third, it could fix a future date for each tort by which
all claims must be filed. Fourth, it could add a provision requiring
application of the applicable foreign or international limitations
period. Last, Congress could clarify the current uncertainty by clearly
stating that ATCA does not have any statute of limitations at all.
This Section addresses each alternative in detail.
1. Apply an Express Statute of Limitations to All Federal Statutes
Without One
In 1990, recognizing the difficulties created by not having
statutes of limitations incorporated into many of its laws, Congress
passed the Judicial Improvements Act (JIA). 24 This Act provided a
default four-year limitations period for all post-1990 Federal statutes
248. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000)).
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without an express statute of limitations. 249 Because the ATCA is a
pre-1990 statute, the JIA does not apply to ATCA claims. One
commentator has suggested that federal courts could simply borrow
the JIA's four-year limitations period and use it as the limitations
period for any claim brought under a pre-1990 statute that does not
have a stated period.25°
Congress could amend the JIA to make it expressly apply to pre-
1990 statutes without an express limitations period. This solution is
unlikely to occur, however, as Congress, in passing the JIA, has
already considered and essentially rejected such a blanket retroactive
application.
[R]etroactively imposing a four year statute of limitations on
legislation that the courts have previously ruled is subject to a
six month limitations period in one statute, and a ten year period
in another, would threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of
a great many parties. Given that settling the expectations of
prospective parties is an essential purpose of statutes of
limitation, the Committee was reluctant to apply this section
retroactively without further study to ensure that the benefits of
retroactive application would indeed outweigh the costs.251
The "settled expectations" of claimants involved only with
ATCA litigation would perhaps be subject to less variation in statutes
of limitations than the House discussed as it considered applying the
JIA to all pre-1990 legislation. Therefore, Congress could more
readily amend the JIA to apply to ATCA alone or could amend the
ATCA to apply the JIA's limitations period." 2  While these
approaches would provide a fixed period that was longer than that of
many state personal injury statutes of limitations, four years would
probably still be too short for initiation of many complex ATCA
claims, and is far shorter than the TVPA ten-year limitations period.
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1658, Time limitations on the commencement of civil actions arising
under Acts of Congress. This statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of
Congress enacted after [Dec. 1, 1990] may not be commenced later than 4 years after
the cause of action accrues.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action that involves a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation... may be brought not later than the earlier of (1) 2 years
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such
violation.
250. Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using
Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE L.J.
393, 396 (1997).
251. Id. at 399 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870).
252. Seeid.at396.
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2. Apply the TVPA Limitations Period to All ATCA Claims
Many courts currently analogize the TVPA's ten-year period to
ATCA claims. Congress could make this a statutory approach by
amending ATCA to incorporate the TVPA limitations period. Ten
years is far longer than most state personal injury limitations periods.
All parties would more readily understand a fixed ten-year period, and
it would appear to provide sufficient time to bring most suits for
typical human rights violations. However, in particularly traumatic
events (such as World War II slave labor cases) and in certain types of
environmental claims (where long-term damage may not be noticed or
understood within a ten-year period), ten years may be too short. In
addition, this period falls far short of the current unlimited state and
federal criminal statutes of limitations for murder.
3. Set Fixed Future Limitations Dates for Filing ATCA Claims
In 1991, California passed Section 354.6, a novel approach to
World War II statute of limitations problems.253 This statute allows
U.S. citizens and aliens to initiate state claims until December 31,
2010, for damages caused by forced labor during World War II in
areas controlled by the Axis powers.5 4 However, in dismissing a
claim brought under this statute by foreign slave laborers in wartime
Japan, the federal court ruled the statute unconstitutional as an
impermissible state interference in the exclusive foreign affairs power
of the United States.255
The constitutional barrier the court found with the California
statute would not exist if Congress were to set such fixed future dates
for filing ATCA claims. Such statutes would most likely reduce the
current uncertainty about the ATCA limitations period. Potential
parties would more easily understand such fixed dates; and if the dates
were set far enough into the future, there is an increased likelihood
that claimants would have sufficient time to initiate their suits.
Implementing this solution, however, would require Congress to pass
legislation for every international event that had resulted or could
result in tort claims. Even discussing such legislation could anger
253. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6.
254. Id. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 states in pertinent part:
(b) Any Second World War slave labor victim, or... forced labor victim... may
bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed... from any entity or
successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or
through a subsidiary or affiliate .... (c) Any action brought under this section shall
not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if the
action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.
255. Japanese Forced Labor, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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many nations, who might view Congressional action directed at events
in their countries as an unwarranted interference in their internal
affairs. Such legislation could also cause bitter internal political fights
over whether a given world event was serious enough to rate passage
of a fixed date for initiating claims. Given these difficulties, there is a
strong possibility that Congress would not fix any date at all.
Furthermore, this approach would simply shift the case-by-case
determination of a statute of limitations from the federal courts to
Congress. In addition, the courts have not indicated that Congress
intended to adopt a case-by-case approach to determine timeliness of
claims under the ATCA.256 The California approach would therefore
not remedy the current problems with ATCA limitations law. It
would be much simpler and promote certainty simply to pass a single
law amending the ATCA.
4. Apply Foreign or International Limitations Periods
Another solution would be for Congress to apply the limitations
periods of the foreign country in which the tort occurred.
Alternatively, since ATCA claims are often based on torts recognized
by international law, Congress could mandate application of statutes
of limitations based in international law. However, the ATCA's
effectiveness would be greatly weakened if the laws of the foreign
nation in which the harmful conduct occurred were allowed to govern
the applicable limitations period.2"7 Foreign states could effectively
prevent their own citizens from bringing claims under the ATCA. It
would also be difficult for the U.S. courts to determine the effective
limitations period for bringing a personal injury claim under foreign
law, especially where a foreign nation's concepts of limitations of
actions for tortious conduct differ from those of United States. In
addition, by adopting foreign limitations periods, uniformity of
application of the ATCA would certainly not be promoted.
There are no express statutes of limitations for torts committed
under international law. Courts determine whether a case is time
barred or not by examining the specific facts of the case.258 Therefore,
applying international law to an ATCA claim would be little different
from the current uncertain federal limitations period.
256. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
257. Id. at 1548.
258. Seeid. at 1547.
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5. Clarify That the ATCA Does Not Have a Statute of Limitations
On its face, the ATCA has no statute of limitations.259 It is only
by operation of subsequent federal court decisions and statutory
restrictions that courts have read a statue of limitations into the
ATCA. What would be the effect if Congress clarified the matter by
declaring that the ATCA really did not have any limitations period?
The Genocide Convention contains no statute of limitations.26 °
The Convention's prohibition against genocide means that "when
executions occur in fulfillment of genocidal aims, [ATCA] actions for
wrongful death can be brought. '26 1 Without a clarifying amendment
to ATCA, a court might apply the TVPA ten-year statute of
limitations to a wrongful death suit derived from a genocidal act,
analogizing wrongful deaths to summary executions, a specific cause
of action in the TVPA. However, the enormity of genocide is on a
scale far outside of those contemplated by most people when thinking
of summary executions. Genocide consists not only of murdering
people, but includes the targeted effort to eliminate an entire
population of people.262 Indeed, genocide has been termed the "crime
of crimes.- 263  In addition, the U.S. statute implementing the
Genocide Convention specifically has no limitations period for murder
committed in conjunction with genocidal crimes. 264  Therefore, any
amendment relating to ATCA's limitations period should provide for
a longer period for claims derived from genocidal crimes than that
specified by the TVPA. This approach would avoid the problems
faced by World War II slave labor litigants, such as in Iwanowa and
Japanese Slave Labor, who have been denied a remedy simply because
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See supra note 15 for full text of the ATCA.
260. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
261. Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53
(1981), reprinted in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 19, at 87.
262. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (2000). The
crime of genocide is defined under the Genocide Convention as:
[A]cts constituting the crime of genocide include (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious or bodily mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
Id.
263. Id. at 9.
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000). See supra note 123 for pertinent text of the statute.
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they waited too long to bring their otherwise legitimate and provable
claims for genocidal acts265 committed against them.
Setting a clear limitations period may not be as important as
determining the tolling rules applicable to such cases. "In general,
statutes of limitation should not present substantial problems in suits
under the TVPA or the ATCA: even when the suits concern human
rights violations that occurred outside the limitations period,
principles of equitable tolling will frequently toll the running of the
statute. "266
D. Congress Should Amend the ATCA to Add a Statute of Limitations
To provide a more definitive period for initiation of tort claims
under the ATCA, Congress should amend that statute to add an
explicit ten-year limitations period for all claims other than those
derived from genocide. For claims derived from genocide, no statute
of limitations should apply. In addition, either the amendment's text
or the Congressional committee reports should expressly provide that
equitable tolling principles and the discovery rule apply, in the same
manner that the Senate felt a need to specify that those doctrines
applied to the TVPA.267
Providing an unlimited period for filing tort claims relating to
genocidal crimes seems appropriate for any proposed ATCA
amendment. It would be illogical to have a short limitations period for
civil suits derived from genocidal crimes, but have no limitations
period for genocide itself. That is because the risk of error is greater in
criminal prosecutions for genocide (with penalties of life in prison or
execution) than in civil litigation (with only monetary damages), yet
the limitations period for genocide, with the much higher risk of
fading memories and lost witnesses, never ends. Therefore, the
ATCA amendment should also contain a provision that no limitations
period will apply to torts derived from criminal acts of genocide.
Because Iwanowa was a child forcibly removed from her home by the
Nazis, along with many other children, her case would likely fit one of
the genocide definitions, namely "[f]orcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.26' If she could show that she fit this
definition, under the proposed ATCA amendment her claim would
not have been time barred.
265. See SCHABAS, supra note 262.
266. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 132, at 147.
267. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 11 (1991).
268. See SCHABAS, supra note 262.
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Retroactivity is another important issue that is bound to come up
if the ATCA statute of limitations is amended as suggested above.
Generally, courts do not apply tort statutes of limitations retroactively
where it does not appear that the legislature intended that they be so
applied.26 9 However, although the TVPA does not explicitly apply
retroactively, the court nevertheless applied it retroactively in
Xuncax.17  The court found that retroactive application was
appropriate because the TVPA could be viewed as "closing a
perceived 'jurisdictional gap."'271 Currently, the ten-year TVPA
statute of limitations is preventing filing of ATCA suits asking for
damages from the African slave trade.272 If the ATCA were amended
to provide for an unlimited limitations period for harms committed in
conjunction with genocide, it would be desirable for Congress to
consider whether retroactivity applies. A discussion about the merits
of allowing retroactivity in the amended ATCA is beyond this
Comment's scope.
V. CONCLUSION
The ATCA presents a method for foreign claimants to obtain
justice in U.S. courts for outrageous torts committed outside the
country. To the degree that current application of uncertain statutes
of limitations under the ATCA bars otherwise valid claims, foreigners
attempting to apply the ATCA are unable to obtain justice in the U.S.
legal system. While the current trend of applying the ten-year
limitations period of the TVPA represents a good start towards
affording consistency in ATCA limitations jurisprudence, this method
has not been adopted by all courts, has not been ratified by the
Supreme Court, and as judicial common law, may not stand the test of
time.
Overall, arguments for amending the ATCA outweigh those for
keeping the status quo. First, to provide a certain period for initiation
of tort claims under the ATCA, Congress should amend that statute
to add a ten-year limitations period. Second, the amended ATCA
should expressly provide for equitable tolling principles and the
discovery rule, so that claims brought long after the statutory period
have a chance at validity. Finally, the statute should specifically
provide for an unlimited time for bringing claims involving torts
269. See 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 46, § 5:28, at 899.
270. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 177 (D. Mass. 1995).
271. Id.at178n.14.
272. Ryan M. Spitzer, The African Holocaust: Should Europe Pay Reparations to Africa for
Colonialism and Slavery? 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1342 (2002).
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committed as part of the crime of genocide, so that the survivors can
pursue a small measure of justice for as long as it takes to bring their
claims. The knowledge that the offenders could never have repose
from their crimes would restrain the actions of the worst human rights
violators.
